The defendant was ordered by the District Court to make restitution payments to the DOC (who would then make disbursements to her victims). Instead, she made payments to one of her victims, who did not share with the other victims. SCOMONT held that because Striplin made her payments to a victim instead of the DOC as ordered by the judge, it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to revoke her suspended sentence for failure to pay restitution.
The District Court, after revoking Striplin’s suspended sentences, sentenced her to five years with the DOC on each count, with all five years suspended. The court also reimposed all the terms and conditions of her prior sentence except the obligation to pay restitution. Instead, the court found Striplin did not have the ability to pay so (as an additional count) sentenced her to thirty days in the county detention center. SCOMONT ruled that because the District Court revoked Striplin’s suspended sentence under § 46-18-203(7)(a)(iii), MCA, the additional condition requiring thirty days in the detention center was an additional, more burdensome, condition that the court had no authority to impose.
