Big Sky Blawg

In June 2004, Thornton sued Deist in Federal Court in Missoula.  Following dismissal of that claim, in May 2006, Deist filed a malicious prosecution complaint in Missoula District Court (state court).  Thornton moved to have venue changed to Flathead County, arguing that because both parties reside there, it is where the suit should have been commenced.  The District Court denied the motion. 

Deist argued that because the tort (malicious prosecution) was committed in Missoula County, it was the proper venue.  Despite Thornton’s argument that she was required to file suit in Missoula because it was the location of the federal court, SCOMONT ruled that the:

purported breach of duty occurred when she intentionally and with alleged malice filed and prosecuted an unsupportable federal cause of action against Deist.  To do so, she willingly traveled to Missoula County where, for approximately two years, the federal court prosecuted this matter before terminating it in favor of Deist.  Moreover, substantial evidence supports Deist’s claim that he suffered damages in Missoula County as a result of Thornton’s suit.  The concurrence of breach and damages in Missoula County support the District Court’s conclusion that Missoula County was a proper venue for Deist’s malicious prosecution claim.

Deist, ¶ 15.

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After a thorough review of establishing personal jurisdiction through minimum contacts, SCOMONT declined to alter its approach to the due process analysis and reiterated that the correct approach is a three-factor due process test first enunciated in Simmons v. State, 206 Mont. 264, 276 (1983). 

The Court went on to distinguish a large number of cases cited by the appellant for a variety of reasons.  The discussion is detailed, lengthy, and probably required reading for anyone dealing with the issue.  A brief overview follows:

For a Montana court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, two questions must be considered.  (1) Does the nonresident defendant come within the provisions of Montana’s long-arm jurisdiction statute; and (2) would exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over the nonresident comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice?

B.T. Metal Works v. United Die & Mfg. Co., 2004 MT 286, ¶ 16.

In Simmons, we explained that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a non-resident defendant, and that a state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident only if minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state exist. Simmons, 206 Mont. at 272-73, 670 P.2d at 1376-77 (citations omitted). We adopted the Ninth Circuit test for determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process:

(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking its laws.

(2) The claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant’s forum-related activities.

(3) Exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.

Simmons, 206 Mont. at 276, 670 P.2d at 1378 (citing Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech. Assoc., Inc. (9th Cir.1977), 557 F.2d 1280, 1287).

B.T. Metal Works, ¶ 34.

In determining reasonability under factor three above, Montana Courts are to employ the test originally set forth in Simmons Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., 244 Mont. 75.

(1) The extent of the defendant’s purposeful interjection into Montana;

(2) The burden on the defendant of defending in Montana;

(3) The extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state;

(4) Montana’s interest in adjudicating the dispute;

(5) The most efficient resolution of the controversy;

(6) The importance of Montana to the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief; and

(7) The existence of an alternative forum.

Further, we noted that “[t]he above factors are not mandatory tests, each of which the plaintiff must pass in order for the court to assume jurisdiction. Rather, the factors simply illustrate the concepts of fundamental fairness, which must be considered in each jurisdictional analysis.” Simmons [Oil Corp.], 244 Mont. at 88, 796 P.2d at 197.

Nasca v. Hull, 2004 MT 306, ¶ 32. 

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