In a dispute over the proper test for determining “business income,” under § 15-31-301(1), MCA, SCOMONT concluded that the statute includes both a transactional test and a separate function test.  This determination was based on the statutory language and extrinsic aids, such as the relevant act’s statutory history, and the act’s goals of promoting uniformity among states in the taxation of corporations.

Download Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Revenue

After selling marijuana twice to a confidential informant who was wearing a wire, Schwartz was arrested and charged with distribution of dangerous drugs.  Because the police failed to obtain a warrant authorizing the electronic surveillance, Schwartz filed a motion to suppress “all statements, cash, drugs, observations and other evidence obtained as the result of an illegal warantless search conducted by a confidential informant outfitted with a body wire.”  The District Court denied the motion based primarily on State v. Brown, 232 Mont. 1 (1988), which held that one participant to a conversation can consent to having it electronically monitored without the necessity of a search warrant.  After the denial of his motion, Schwartz pled guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.

Despite the fact that State v. Goetz, 2008 MT 296, effectively over ruled Brown (holding that electronic monitoring and recording of an individual’s conversations with the confidential informant in that case constituted a search subject to the warrant requirement of Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution), SCOMONT ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support Schwartz’s guilty plea wholly apart from the electronic surveillance.  The District Court’s decision was affirmed.

Download State v. Schwartz

Emanuel v. Great Falls School District – 2009 MT 185

In January 2002, Daniel Robbins (Robbins) turned in a school assignment containing his New Year’s Resolution List.  The list contained several violent items, including “[g]et a drivers license so I can do those horrible things people like to read about in the paper,” and “kill the tooth fairy.”  There were no allegations that the list contained no specific threats against non-fictional persons.  This resulted in a meeting with Robbins’, his mother, and the school counselor.  Because nothing was resolved at this first meeting, a subsequent meeting with held with Robbins’, his mother, the school principal and the associate principal.  The conclusion of this meeting was that although the list was inappropriate and should be taken seriously, this was a teenage attempt at black humor.

Approximately 17 months later, Robbins purposely ran over Patricia Emanuel as she was jogging past Robbins’ high school.  The passenger in Robbins’ vehicle told police that Robbins stated that he planned to run her over and engage in necrophilia with her corpse.

Emanuel filed suit against GFSD (Robbins’ school), alleging that the school was negligent in handling Robbins and the resolution list.  The District Court granted summary judgement for GFSD, finding that there was no special relationship between GFSD and Emanuel, therefore GFSD was under no duty to protect Emanuel from Robbins.

SCOMONT avoided the issue of whether a special relationship is required in order to give rise to the duty of ordinary care to protect others against harm from third persons by finding that Emanuel was not a foreseeable plaintiff.  “If a reasonably prudent defendant can foresee neither any danger of direct injury nor any risk from an intervening cause he is simply not negligent.”  Prindel v. Ravalli County, 2006 MT 62, ¶ 39.  SCOMONT concluded that GFSD need not have “foreseen that Robbins would deliberately run over a pedestrian, after school hours, off school grounds, nearly seventeen months after the disturbing New Year’s Resolution list was brought to its attention.”  Emanuel, ¶ 15.  “Therefore, the District Court did not err in concluding that, as a matter of law, GFSD owed no duty to Emanuel.”  Emanuel, ¶ 16.

Download Emanuel v. Great Falls School District

Saale was involved in a single car accident soon after leaving a Bar.  Passers by helped Salle out of her vehicle and noticed that she was highly intoxicated, but not seriously injured.  Soon after, Saale’s husband (Chris) arrived at the scene, place Saale in his vehicle and took her home.  When officers arrived on the scene, they learned of Saale’s departure and, en route to her home, contacted the on-call county attorney for advice on entering the home without a  warrant.  The officers were told they could enter the home without a warrant due to exigent circumstances.

Upon arriving at the home, officers were met by Chris who refused entry and placed himself in the doorway to block the trooper’s entry.  He was handcuffed and removed from the scene and Saale was removed from the residence and taken to the scene of her accident.  At the scene, she refused medical treatment, refused any field sobriety tests, and failed a portable breath test.  Saale’s Motion to Suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search of her home was denied in Justice Court and District Court on the basis of exigent circumstances. Saale appealed.

Exigent Circumstances are “those that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry (or other prompt action) was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of a suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.”  State v. Wakeford, 1998 MT 16, ¶ 24.  The State argued that the potential destruction of evidence (Saale’s level of intoxication), and the possibility that Saale had sustained serious injuries justified the warrantless entry.

SCOMONT rejected the “destruction of evidence” argument because a person’s blood alcohol content (BAC) “is not evidence until it exists in a state capable of analysis.” State v. Peplow, 2001 MT 253, ¶ 25.  ”[T]aking into account our holding in Peplow, it is illogical to conclude there was an exigent circumstance arising from the potential destruction of evidence, as there was no physical evidence in existence.  Without a sample previously extracted from the body, there was simply no physical evince to destroy.”  Saale, ¶ 11.

The Court likewise rejected the physical safety argument because the officers had already been informed that Saale did not appear to be seriously injured by witnesses at the scene.  Additionally, Justice Cotter noted that “if the ostensible exigency had been a true concern for her physical well-being, the officers presumably would have taken Saale directly to the emergency room rather than have her sit idly and unattended in the backseat of a patrol car for 45 minutes while they investigated the scene.”  Saale, ¶ 14.

The State failed to meet their heavy burden in demonstrating the existence of truly exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry into Saale’s home.

Download State v. Saale

After being stopped for speeding (103 in a 75), Hurlbert was detained by a Highway Patrol Officer because Hurlbert’s behavior indicated possible illegal activity in addition to the speeding.  When asked for permission to search the car, Hurlbert said that the officer would need to obtain permission from his wife because the car was her’s.  The officer did so, and found no evidence of illegal activity.  While the officer was on the phone with Hurlbert’s wife she told him that Hurlbert had “prior drug activity.”  During this initial search, Hurlbert, who was seated in a patrol car, but not restrained in any way, spontaneously admitted that there was a blue box which contained a spoon and a syringe in his fanny back.

After the search of the vehicle, the officer advised Hurlbert of his Miranda rights, which Hurlbert stated that he understood – but declined counsel and agreed to answer questions.  He did not sign any form related to his waiver of these rights.  He did, however, sign  a form giving consent to search his personal belongings as well as give oral consent.  Inside his fanny pack the officer discovered the blue metal box containing “a couple syringes, a spoon, various baggies, and … a white powdery substance imprinted on the spoon and in some baggies.”  A field test of the white powder indicated it contained methamphetamine.

Hurlbert raised 4 issues on appeal:

Issue 1:  Whether the law enforcement officer’s continued questioning of Hurlbert exceeded the scope of the stop.

Generally, a traffic stop may not last longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.  Section 46-5-401, MCA.  However, if additional objective data of wrongdoing exists, the additional information may give rise to further suspicions and enlarge the scope of the investigation.  State v. Nelson, 2004 MT 310, ¶ 20.  SCOMONT ruled that there was sufficient evidence presented of objective data from which the officer could make certain inferences of wrongdoing – Hurlbert was nervous, shaking, very uneasy and constantly moving, sweating quite a bit, would not site still, rapidly smoking a cigarette, and he would open his wallet and stare at it.

Issue 2:  Whether Hurlbert’s wife’s consent to search the vehicle was valid.

On appeal, Hurlbert argued that because he lawfully possessed the vehicle at the time of the stop, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in it and was thus entitled to protection from any unlawful searches and seizures.  SCOMONT found that Hurlbert did not demonstrate that he was prejudiced in any way from the search of the vehicle as that search revealed nothing unlawful.  ”A cause may not be reversed by reason of any error committed by the trial court against the convicted person unless the record shows that the error was prejudicial.”  Section 46-20-701(1), MCA.  SCOMONT found that Hurlbert made no such showing.

Additionally, SCOMONT found that Hurlbert had acquiesced or participated in the search by stating that the officer would have to ask his wife for permission to search the vehicle because it belonged to her.  State v. Cybulski, 2009 MT 79, ¶ 61.  ”Hurlbert waived his right to object to the search of the vehicle when he disclaimed that he had authority to grant permission to search it, and he thereby conceded that he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.”  Hurlbert, ¶ 29.

Issue 3:  Whether Hurlbert was properly advised of his Miranda rights.

SCOMONT concluded that Hurlbert was not entitled to a Miranda warning prior to being asked for consent to search the vehicle because he was not in custody at at that time.  The District Court concluded that Hurlbert was in custody after the officer told him to leave his keys on the dashboard of the car and exit his vehicle for the search.  However, no interrogation took place between that point and when Hurlbert was Mirandized.  Hurlbert’s spontaneous “statement was made voluntarily and not in response to questioning by either officer.”  Hurlbert, ¶ 36.

At trial, Hurlbert claimed he was never advised of his Miranda rights, but the District Court found the officers’ account more credible and Hurlbert not particularly credible.  Because the weight of evidence and the credibility of witnesses are exclusively within the province of the trier of fact, SCOMONT deferred to the District Court’s determination that the Miranda warnings were given prior to any custodial interrogation.

Issue 4:  Whether Hurlbert’s consent to search his belongings was given voluntarily.

SCOMONT has adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances test for determining whether consent was given freely, voluntarily and without duress or coercion.  While SCOMONT found that a few facts pointed to the possibility that Hurlbert’s consent was not voluntary, “the overwhelming evidence demonstrates that Hurlbert’s consent to search his personal belongings was given freely and voluntarily.”  Hurlbert, ¶ 49.

Download State v. Hurlbert

The Court addressed whether an exception for child victims exists to the rule that a youth cannot consent to a search of the shared property of she and her parents. In State v. Schwartz, SCOMONT established “a per se rule that a youth under the age of sixteen lacks the capacity or authority to consent to a search of her parents’ home.” Schwartz, ¶ 14. Schwartz explicitly left no such exception, but the State argued in Ellis that one was necessary to protect minor children. Justice Nelson dismissed those concerns, observing that the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that requiring a warrant when consent to search is disputed does not prevent law enforcement officers from protecting victims of domestic violence. He went on to note that, as a practical matter, it would have been possible for the officers involved to engage a neutral magistrate to review an application for a search warrant.

Stating that one of the first cases cited in Schwartz considered the possibility that a child may consent to a search of the home after reporting that they were the victim of or a witness to a crime, SCOMONT held that no such exception existed to the Schwartz rule. Concurring in the majority opinion were Cotter, Warner and District Court Judge Sandefur (sitting for Chief Justice McGrath).

Download State v. Ellis

Amber and Thomas were divorced in 2008 and agreed to a joint parenting plan under which Amber was the primary custodian of the children, and Thomas had visitation on alternate weekends, and during the summer and holidays.  Both parents were living in Miles City, Montana at the time of the divorce and the implementation of the parenting plan, but subsequently Amber decided to move to Kalispell, Montana.  Thomas filed a petition to modify the parenting plan to award him primary custody of the children, which the District Court approved ruling that because Amber decided to move to Kalispell, she should be the one who pays the price of reduced parental contact.

SCOMONT ruled, for the first time, “that the right to travel guaranteed by the United States Constitution includes the right to travel within Montana.” Plaisted-Harman, ¶ 11.  It is a fundamental right, and as such a restriction that penalizes persons who exercise the right must be justified by a compelling state interest.  Chief Justice McGrath stated “[t]he District Court may not penalize Amber for exercising her right to travel by removing her as the primary custodial parent of the children, and it was an abuse of discretion to do so.”  Id., ¶ 12.

Download In re The Marriage of Plaisted-Harman

“A potential juror who has formed a fixed opinion about the case before being empaneled is not impartial, and generally should not be seated even though he says he will try to set his opinion aside.”  Herman, ¶ 26.  Because a potential juror in this case participated in 5 or 6 conversations with the County Attorney regarding this case and admitted to already forming an opinion about the defendant’s guilt, the District Court abused its discretion in denying Herman’s challenge for cause.  The judgement was reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Download State v. Herman.

Following a Motion to Dismiss filed by Child, the State submitted its response brief more than ten days later, but still within the timeline for a response brief set by the Omnibus Order’s briefing schedule.  Child argued that under Rule 2 of the Uniform District Court Rules, the “failure to file an answer brief by the adverse party within ten days shall be deemed an admission that the motion is well taken.”  The District Court agreed, and dismissed the case.  (Although irrelevant for the current analysis, it’s worth noting that the order was later rescinded).  Because such an argument would render the dates set in the Omnibus Order meaningless, SCOMOT ruled that the Uniform Rules had no application and reversed the order of dismissal.

Justice Nelson wrote a concurrence chastising  the State for failing to cite any authority in its three paragraph opening brief, and noting how often the State requests that SCOMONT dismiss a defendant’s appeal for failure to do the same.  He goes on to address the District Court’s attempt to rescind its dismissal order noting that “[w]hen a criminal case is dismissed with prejudice, the dismissed information is no longer effective against the defendant and cannot be reinstated.” Child, ¶ 18, citing State ex. rel. Torres v. District Court, 265 Mont. 445 (1994).

Download State v. Child

Issue: Whether a person in a parked vehicle is necessarily seized when an officer stops behind the parked vehicle without activating the emergency lights on the patrol car and contacts the person in the vehicle.

Noting that the officer did not initiate the stop of Wilkins’ vehicle, the officer did not impede her liberty by means of physical force or show of authority,  the officer did not have his emergency lights or sirens on, nor did he shine a spotlight into her car – SCOMONT concluded that the stop in a public place did not amount to a seizure.  Because there was no seizure, there was no need to engage in an analysis of particularized suspicion or the community caretaker doctrine.  Without a seizure,  particularized suspicion was not necessary to justify the contact and the evidence obtained from the interaction was admissible.

Download State v. Wilkins