Big Sky Blawg

In 2003, Shepard was charged with multiple offenses including deliberate homicide, burglary, and aggravated kidnapping. She entered into a plea agreement and pled guilty to deliberate homicide and burglary in exchange for the State’s motion to dismiss the remaining charges. The agreement provided that the State was free to recommend any sentence permitted by law, excluding death and the State agreed to recommend that any sentence imposed for the burglary offense would be served concurrently with the sentence imposed for deliberate homicide. The State honored its commitments.

At sentencing, the District Court made Shepard ineligible for parole, which resulted in Shepard petitioning to the Sentence Review Division. At the sentence review hearing, the State appeared, contradicted the factual background given by Shepard and opposed her request that the parole restriction be removed from her sentence.

Over a year later, Shepard filed a motion to withdraw her guilty pleas, asserting that the State’s statements at the sentence review constituted breach of the plea agreement. The District Court denied the motion and Shepard appealed.

On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court initially addressed the issue of the proper standard of review, deciding that because a plea agreement is a contract and subject to contract law standards, State v. Hill, 2009 MT 137, ¶ 49, it is a question of law and reviewed de novo.

As to the merits of the appeal, SCOMONT ruled that although a plea agreement could be negotiated in such a way to restrict the State’s actions before the Sentence Review Division or otherwise impose continuing obligations on the State, the agreement at issue here did not. The Court ruled that “the plea agreement was drafted to unambiguously apply to the sentencing process before the District Court and that court’s disposition of the case. It did not contemplate later proceedings, and thus, the State did not violate an express provision of the plea agreement.” ¶ 14.

SCOMONT also noted that the State could, theoretically, have undermined, and therefore violated, the plea agreement by arguing for a different or harsher sentence before the Sentence Review Division. However, the Court believed that this was not the case here and affirmed the District Court.

The defendant was ordered by the District Court to make restitution payments to the DOC (who would then make disbursements to her victims).  Instead, she made payments to one of her victims, who did not share with the other victims.  SCOMONT held that because Striplin made her payments to a victim instead of the DOC as ordered by the judge, it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to revoke her suspended sentence for failure to pay restitution.

The District Court, after revoking Striplin’s suspended sentences, sentenced her to five years with the DOC on each count, with all five years suspended.  The court also reimposed all the terms and conditions of her prior sentence except the obligation to pay restitution.  Instead, the court found Striplin did not have the ability to pay so (as an additional count) sentenced her to thirty days in the county detention center.  SCOMONT ruled that because the District Court revoked Striplin’s suspended sentence under § 46-18-203(7)(a)(iii), MCA, the additional condition requiring thirty days in the detention center was an additional, more burdensome, condition that the court had no authority to impose.

Download State v. Striplin

A defendant’s sentence may be enhanced under the Persistent Felony Offender Statute when the second felony was committed before conviction of the first.  Even if the defendant had no convictions at the time she committed her second felony, she may still be sentenced as a PFO.  SCOMONT ruled that this was the clear precedent of State v. Hamm, 250 Mont. 123 (1991), and State v. Williamson, 218 Mont. 242 (1985), and declined to overturn those cases as “manifestly wrong.”

Download State v. Anderson

Simpson pled guilty to felony common scheme theft by embezzlement and the conditions of his defferred imposition of sentence included 1) no drugs or alcohol, 2) obtaining a mental health evaluation, and 3) no casinos or gambling. He claimed that the three conditions had no nexus to his crimes.

SCOMONT agreed that terms 1 and 2 were impermissible under State v. Ashby, 2008 MT 83, because sentencing must be individualized and have some nexus to the offender or the offense.  However, Simpson stated that he embezzled from his employer because “funds [were] tight.”  This established a sufficient nexus to warrant the gambling restriction and the court affirmed condition 3.

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Smart pled guilty to two counts of sexual intercourse without consent.  At sentencing, the District Court imposed a prohibition on drinking and drug use and on entry into bars and a requirement that Smart submit to annual polygraph testing, if requested as part of a Sex Offender Treatment or Aftercare.  Both conditions were challenged on appeal.

With Justice Cotter writing the majority opinion, SCOMONT held that a district court may impose a polygraph examination requirement on a defendant for sex offender treatment purposes (citing State v. Hameline, 2008 MT 241).  And, because Smart did not suffer from significant or chronic alcohol abuse, nor was there a nexus between alcohol abuse and his crimes, the Court held that the alcohol-related restrictions should be stricken.

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In February of 1994, White pled guilty to theft and was given a three year deferred sentence. Six months later, in August, her deferred sentence was revoked for consuming alchohol and a ten year sentence was imposed. She was required to serve 30 days in the Flathead County Detention Center and the rest of the sentence was suspended. Additionally, she was required to pay a fine of $1,000, pay a surcharge of $100, and submit to screening for Intensive Supervised Probation. In 1996, the 1994 judgement was amended to require White to submit to blood, breath or urine analysis at the request of her probation officer.

In May of 1997, the District Court found that White had consumed alchohol, thereby violating her probation and revoked her suspended sentence. Among other changes, the court added the requirements that she attend AA meetings four times a week (unless her probation officer said otherwise), and to attend counseling that her probation officer thought necessary.

A District Court has no power to impose a sentence in the absence of specific statutory authority. State v. Ruiz, 2005 MT 117, ¶ 12. MCA § 46-18-203(7)(c) authorizes a court revoking a suspended sentence to “require the defendant to serve either the sentence imposed or any lesser sentence.” The additional conditions imposed on White in 1997 where in excess of this statutory authority and, therefore, illegal. Despite White’s claim that the entire sentence was illegal, the Court held that the proper remedy is simply to strike the offending conditions.